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Abstract—Social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment is analyzed for
a society composed of two cohesive groups of similar size. Within the model of random walks
determined by voting, explicit formulas are derived for the capital increments of the groups
against the parameters of the environment and “claim thresholds” of the groups. The “unan-
imous acceptance” and “unanimous rejection” group rules are considered as the voting proce-
dures. Claim thresholds are evaluated that are most beneficial to the participants of the groups
and to the society as a whole.
1. INTRODUCTION
This work was carried out within the framework of analyzing social dynamics determined by
democratic decisions in a stochastic environment. The subject of investigation is the relationship
between the parameters of social dynamics and social strategies of the participants including egoism,
collectivism (corporatism) and altruism. The results for the situation where a cohesive group
competes with egoistic participants are reported in [1, 2]; competition between egoists and two
cohesive groups (parties) was studied in [3]. The latter paper also considers the so-called “snowball
of cooperation” mechanism which, under certain conditions, motivates those participants initially
having egoistic strategies to act altruistically.
The present paper investigates a special case of the situation considered in [3], namely, compe-
tition of two groups. The relative simplicity of this case enables us to obtain explicit formulas for
the most interesting relationships.
Let us recall the basic features of our model of voting in a stochastic environment. Being
composed of a finite number of participants, the society sequentially votes for/against proposals that
are regularly generated by the “environment” according to a random law. A proposal is identified
with a vector of capital increments of the participants; an alternative interpretation involves the
utility values of the participants. According to the model, the capital/utility increments entering
the proposal are realizations of independent and identically distributed random variables. Here,
the normal distribution is mainly considered. During the vote, an egoistic participant supports any
proposal that increases his/her capital. In contrast to egoists, the members of a group vote jointly
for those proposals that would be favorable for the whole group (the latter is characterized by a
certain index). In particular, a group may support proposals that increase either the capital of the
majority of its members or the total group capital. Each proposal is accepted (and implemented)
or rejected under a particular voting procedure. Generally, the procedures of α-majority are used.
The parameter α ∈ [0, 1) determines the share of votes necessary and sufficient for the acceptance
of a proposal.
The presence of a stochastic environment is the focus of the model under consideration; it
preserves many basic phenomena of social reality. At the same time, it enables the investigation of
these phenomena by analytical methods.
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In voting theory, the stochasticity assumption is often applied to choosing the voters’ positions
(see, e.g., [4]). In cooperative game theory, it is widely adopted with respect to the payments [5].
A distinctive feature of our model is a stochastic mechanism for generating proposals for voting. In
other words, we study a model of random walks controlled by voting. In this context, some papers
on the dynamical correction of tax rates are relevant (see, e.g., [6]); note, however, that these
works focus on selecting the rate itself (which is optimized within special models of production and
consumption) and not on the random walks in the space of individual utilities. We also mention a
recent survey on modelling political competition processes that involve voting [7].
2. EXPECTED CAPITAL OF GROUP MEMBERS
Suppose that a society consists of two groups of similar size; every group votes jointly. A natural
voting rule requires that the accepted proposals are supported by both groups. In the sequel, we
use the term unanimous acceptance group rule for this voting procedure. Suppose that the first
(second) group supports a proposal if and only if this proposal leads to the increase in the mean
capital of the group members by at least t1 (respectively, t2). Here, the proposal support thresholds
t1 and t2 are variable parameters which may take positive, zero, or negative values. It is interesting
to investigate the dependence of the future capital of the groups and the whole society on the
proposal support thresholds t1 and t2 (we will also call them claim thresholds). In addition to
the unanimous acceptance group rule, we will consider the rule according to which a proposal is
accepted if and only if it is supported by at least one group. This voting procedure will be called
the unanimous rejection group rule, since a proposal is rejected iff it is rejected by both groups.
In the following theorem, we derive expressions for the average capital increments under the above
voting rules.
Theorem 1. Suppose a proposal is accepted if and only if it is supported by at least one group.
Then the mathematical expectation of the one-step capital increment1 of a member of group i
(i = 1, 2) is given by the formula
M(d˜i) = µF3−i + (µFi + σifi)F3−i. (1)
Here, Fi = F (µi/σi), Fi = 1− Fi, fi = f(µi/σi), f(·) and F (·) denote the density and distribution
function of the standard normal distribution, respectively,2 µi = µ− ti, σi = σ
/√
g
i
, ti is the claim
threshold of group i, gi is the size of group i, while µ and σ are the parameters of the normal
distribution N(µ, σ2) that describes the independent capital increments forming proposals.
Suppose a proposal is accepted if and only if it is supported by both groups. Then the mathematical
expectation of the one-step capital increment of a member of group i (i = 1, 2) is given by the formula
M(d˜i) = (µFi + σifi)F3−i. (2)
Proof. For a given proposal, let G1 (G2) be the event that the first (respectively, second) group
supports the proposal. Denote by G1G2 the simultaneous implementation of G1 and G2. Similarly,
G1G2 and G1G2 are the simultaneous implementation of G1 and the complement of G2, and of the
complements of G1 and G2, respectively. Let P (·) denote the event probability.
To prove the first statement of the theorem, we first suppose that the unanimous rejection group
rule is used. Using the total probability formula one has
M(d˜i) = M(d˜i | G3−i)P (G3−i) +M(d˜i | GiG3−i)P (GiG3−i) +M(d˜i | GiG3−i)P (GiG3−i). (3)
1 Notation with tilde serves to indicate actual (i.e, taking into account the acceptance of proposals) capital increments,
as distinct from the proposed ones.
2 f(t) = 1√
2pi
e−t
2/2 and F (t) = 1√
2pi
∫ t
−∞ e
−x2/2dx.
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On the assumption of GiG3−i, the proposal is rejected; hence, M(d˜i | GiG3−i) = 0. Un-
der G3−i, the proposal is accepted and independence of the proposal components implies that
M(d˜i |G3−i) = µ. Similarly, the proposal is accepted under GiG3−i, and independence of the com-
ponents di yields M(d˜i |GiG3−i) = M(di |GiG3−i) = M(di |Gi). Next, M(di |Gi) = M(d avei |Gi)
with d ave
i
standing for the result of averaging the components of the proposal (these components
correspond to the ith group). Observe that d ave
i
is a random variable having the distribution
N(µ, σ2
i
), where σi = σ
/√
g
i
, and that Gi is tantamount to d
ave
i
> ti. Using the formula for the
conditional mean of a normal random variable (it can be proved by integration) one finally obtains
M(d˜i | GiG3−i) = M(d avei | d avei > ti) = µ+
σifi
Fi
, (4)
where Fi = F (µi/σi), fi = f(µi/σi), and µi = µ − ti. It is also easy to demonstrate that
P (G3−i) = F3−i. Using independence of the proposal components we have the expression
P (GiG3−i) = P (Gi)P (G3−i) = FiF3−i. (5)
Substituting all this into (3) yields
M(d˜i) = µF3−i +
(
µ+
σifi
Fi
)
FiF3−i = µF3−i + (µFi + σifi)F3−i.
This completes the proof of the first part.
Now prove the second statement of the theorem. Suppose that the unanimous acceptance group
rule is used. In this case,
M(d˜i) = M(d˜i | GiG3−i)P (GiG3−i). (6)
Similarly to the derivation of (4), one obtains
M(d˜i | GiG3−i) = M(d avei | d avei > ti) = µ+
σifi
Fi
(7)
and similarly to (5),
P (GiG3−i) = P (Gi)P (G3−i) = FiF3−i. (8)
Substitute (7)–(8) in (6) to get M(d˜i) = (µFi + σifi)F3−i. This completes the proof. ♦
Of special interest are the comparative capital increments of the groups. Indeed, it is important
to know the capital-related performance of each group against the background of the results achieved
by the other one. The expected one-step capital increment of Group 1 as compared with the one
of Group 2 is expressed as M(d˜1 − d˜2). Theorem 1 enables one to obtain simple formulas for
M(d˜1 − d˜2).
Corollary 1. In the notation of Theorem 1, if the unanimous rejection group rule is adopted,
then
M(d˜1 − d˜2) = σ1f1F2 − σ2f2F1. (9)
Under the unanimous acceptance group rule, one has
M(d˜1 − d˜2) = σ1f1F2 − σ2f2F1. (10)
The proof of Corollary 1 is straightforward.
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3. ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL DYNAMICS
In order to apply and interpret the results obtained, let us first consider the case where the
mean proposed capital increment is zero, i.e., the environment is neutral; suppose that the standard
deviation of the proposed capital increment is 10: µ = 0, σ = 10. Suppose that each group includes
300 participants and Group 1 supports a proposal whenever it increases the total capital of the
group (t1 = 0). The claim threshold t2 of Group 2 varies.
In the case of the unanimous acceptance group rule (sometimes, we will call it the (G1∧G2)-rule),
the expected capital increments of the groups and the whole society versus the claim threshold t2
of Group 2, as stated by Theorem 1, are depicted in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Expected capital increments of the groups and the society provided that the unanimous acceptance
group rule is adopted (in this example, it coincides with the majority rule): 1—Group 1; 2—Group 2; 3—
the difference between Group 1 and Group 2; 4—the whole society. The parameters are: µ = 0; σ = 10;
g1 = g2 = 300.
In particular, the average capital increment of Group 2 represents a symmetrical bell-shaped
curve. This can be explained as follows. Setting a positive Group 2 threshold (high claims) leads to
the rejection of some favorable to Group 2 (on the average) proposals, whereas setting a negative
threshold (low claims) leads to the acceptance, along with the favorable to Group 2 proposals, of
some proposals unfavorable to it. So both strategies decrease the expected capital increment of
Group 2 as against the case of t2 = 0. A noteworthy fact is that positive and negative thresholds
of the same absolute value are equivalent. Let us prove it.
Corollary 2. Let µ = 0. Then for fixed values of the model parameters except for t2, any t ∈ IR,
and under either group voting rule, M(d˜2 | t2 = t) =M(d˜2 | t2 = −t) holds.
Proof. Applying Theorem 1 to the case µ = 0 one obtains
M(d˜2) = σ2f2 F1 (11)
for the unanimous rejection group rule and
M(d˜2) = σ2f2 F1 (12)
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for the unanimous acceptance group rule.
The required statement follows from the facts that σ2 and F1 are independent of t2 and that
f2 = f
(
µ− t2
σ2
)
is an even function of t2 provided that µ = 0. ♦
Remark 1. Due to (11)–(12), for both voting rules under consideration, the expression of M(d˜2)
in terms of t2 is proportional to the normal density function, which is a bell-shaped curve with zero
limits as t2 → −∞ and t2 → ∞. Finally, if t1 = 0, then under both voting rules, M(d˜2) = 12σ2f2
holds. ♦
Next we study the characteristics of social dynamics for each voting rule separately.
3.1. The Unanimous Acceptance Group Rule
If the unanimous acceptance group rule is adopted, then Group 1 benefits from low (negative)
claim threshold t2 of Group 2. Indeed, in this case Group 2 rarely vetoes proposals beneficial to
Group 1 and so Group 1 can maximize its benefits. Contrariwise, if t2 is high, then Group 1 can
rarely expect approval of proposals beneficial to it.
Now, suppose that Group 2 aims not at maximizing the average capital increment, but at
ensuring maximum advantage over Group 1. In other words, Group 2 maximizes M(d˜2− d˜1) rather
than M(d˜2). A tool Group 2 can use for this is its claim threshold t2. For instance, in the example
illustrated by Fig. 1, M(d˜2 − d˜1) as a function of t2 attains its maximum when M(d˜1 − d˜2) attains
its minimum, i.e., at t2 ≈ 0.46. In the proposition below, we find the “claim threshold” t2 that
maximizes M(d˜2 − d˜1) in the general case.
Proposition 1. Suppose the unanimous acceptance group rule is adopted. Then, in the notation
of Theorem 1, the expected advantage M(d˜2 − d˜1) of a Group 2 member over a Group 1 member
in the sense of capital increment attains its unique maximum at the claim threshold t2 of Group 2
defined by
t+2 = µ+
σ1f1
F1
. (13)
Proof. Differentiating (10) with respect to t2 we obtain
dM(d˜1 − d˜2)
d t2
=
d (σ1f1F2 − σ2f2F1)
d t2
= σ1f1f2 ·
(−σ−12 )− σ2f2−(t2 − µ)σ22 F1.
Setting the derivative equal to zero results in the desired expression (13). Finding the second
derivative of the functionM(d˜1− d˜2) ensures that a minimum has been found. Hence, (13) provides
the unique maximum of M(d˜2 − d˜1). ♦
Remark 2. It should be noted that the optimal claim threshold t+2 found in Proposition 1 is
independent of the group size g2. It is also interesting that expression (13) coincides with (4) in
which i = 1. In turn, (4) with i = 1 expresses the expected capital increment of a member
of Group 1 provided it exceeds the threshold t1. This observation suggests the following simple
algorithm of estimating the optimal “claim threshold” t+2 by Group 2: (1) find the average capital
increments of Group 1 members according to the proposals that Group 1 supports; (2) set the
threshold t2 equal to the value found on Step (1) averaged over the proposals.
Thus, to achieve an advantage over Group 1, Group 2 should set its claim threshold at a higher
level than Group 1 does. As has been noted before, the optimal threshold t2 is equal to the mean
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“above threshold” value of Group 1 capital increment. In particular, for the example of Fig. 1, (13)
gives t+2 =
√
2
3pi
. Now, if Group 1 wishes to act in the same way (i.e., to maximize its advantage
M(d˜1 − d˜2) with respect to t2 = t+2 ), it should, in turn, set a higher threshold: t1 > t+2 . If this
process continues, it leads to an infinite increase in the claims (the process is divergent and the
corresponding game possesses no Nash equilibrium). ♦
How does the maximum comparative gain M(d˜2 − d˜1) of Group 2 depend on the fixed claim
threshold t1 of Group 1? It increases as t1 → −∞, since in this case Group 1 supports all proposals,
and thus, the decisions are made by Group 2. If t1 grows, then this maximum gain decreases and
tends to zero as t1 →∞ since in this case, no proposals are accepted due to the veto of Group 1.
Now consider the following question which seems quite interesting. What claim threshold t2 of
Group 2 is optimal for the whole society (thus, leading to the maximum expected capital increment
of the society)? The answer is provided by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose the unanimous acceptance group rule is adopted. Then the expected
capital increment of the whole society attains its maximum value at the claim threshold t2 of Group 2
given by
t02 = −
g1
g2
(
µ+
σ1f1
F1
)
. (14)
Proof. Theorem 1 (see (2)) implies that the expected capital increment of the whole society is
g1M(d˜1) + g2M(d˜2) = g1(µF1 + σ1f1)F2 + g2(µF2 + σ2f2)F1
= ((g1 + g2)µF1 + g1σ1f1)F2 + g2σ2f2F1.
The derivative of this function with respect to t2 is
d (g1M(d˜1) + g2M(d˜2))
d t2
= ((g1 + g2)µF1 + g1σ1f1)f2 ·
(−σ−12 )+ g2σ2f2F1−(t2 − µ)σ22 .
Setting it equal to zero one obtains g2F1 (t
0
2−µ) = −(g1+ g2)µF1− g1σ1f1, which leads to (14).
Finally, the second derivative test confirms that this point provides a unique maximum value. ♦
Remark 3. Comparing Propositions 1 and 2 produces a somewhat unexpected result. Namely,
at g1 = g2 those values of claim threshold t2 of Group 2 leading to the maximum advantage over
Group 1 (on the one hand) and to the best results for the whole society (on the other hand) turn
out to be opposite. In particular, this is the case for the example illustrated by Fig. 1. Note that
even if g1 6= g2, the thresholds t+2 and t02 always have different signs (or both are zero), since by
(13) and (14),
t02 = −
g1
g2
t+2 . ♦
Proposition 2 determines t2 (as a function of t1) that guarantees the maximum capital increment
of the whole society. Let us maximize this maximum over t1 to find the global optimal point of the
society. Obviously, the corresponding solutions t1 and t2 satisfy the system of equations
t1 = −g2
g1
(
µ+
σ2f2
F2
)
; t2 = −g1
g2
(
µ+
σ1f1
F1
)
(15)
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with σ1, σ2, f1, f2, F1, and F2 defined in Theorem 1. Most likely, the solution of (15) cannot generally
be expressed in elementary functions. In particular, this applies even to the simplest case of g1 = g2
(two groups of equal size) in which the system (15) reduces to
t1 = −µ− σ1f1
F1
; t2 = t1.
Nevertheless, the solution can be obtained numerically. For instance, the dependence on µ of
the claim threshold t = t1 = t2 optimal for the society is shown (in the case of g1 = g2 = 300 and
σ = 10) in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Relationship between µ and the claim threshold t = t1 = t2 that maximizes the capital increment of
the whole society provided that g1 = g2 = 300 and σ = 10.
In particular, for g1 = g2 = g˜ and µ = 0, the optimal threshold is t = −σy0
/√
g˜, where y0 ≈ 0.506
is the unique solution of the equation y = f(y)/F (y) with f(y) and F (y) designating the density
and distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
One of the most instructive results of this study is that under the unanimous acceptance group
rule, the claim threshold t of the groups that is optimal for the whole society is negative (see Fig. 2).
In the case g1 = g2, it tends to zero from below as µ→ −∞ and asymptotically approaches to the
line t = −µ as µ→∞. Negative claim thresholds of the groups can be interpreted as a willingness
to a moderately negative result, that is, as a certain appetite for risk.
3.2. The Unanimous Rejection Group Rule
Now consider the unanimous rejection group rule (we will also call it the (G1 ∨G2)-rule). With
this procedure, for acceptance of a proposal, the support of either one group is sufficient. The
analytical results obtained in Section 2 are illustrated by the diagram in Fig. 3.
It can be easily observed that this diagram mirrors the one shown in Fig. 1. Indeed, the following
statement holds.
Corollary 3. Let µ = 0. If the model parameters, except for t2, are fixed, then for any t ∈ IR,
MG1∨G2(d˜1 | t2 = t) = MG1∧G2(d˜1 | t2 = −t) holds, where MG1∧G2 (MG1∨G2) is the expectation, pro-
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Fig. 3. Expected capital increments of the members of Groups 1 and 2 and the society under the unanimous
rejection group rule: 1—Group 1; 2—Group 2; 3—the difference between Group 1 and Group 2; 4—the whole
society; the parameters are: µ = 0; σ = 10; g1 = g2 = 300.
vided the unanimous acceptance group rule (resp., the unanimous rejection group rule) is adopted.
Moreover, at t1 = 0 one has MG1∨G2(d˜2 | t2 = t) = MG1∧G2(d˜2 | t2 = t) for any t ∈ IR.
Proof. According to Theorem 1, for µ = 0 we have:
MG1∧G2(d˜1 | t2 = −t) = σ1f1F (t/σ1),
MG1∨G2(d˜1 | t2 = t) = σ1f1 (1− F (−t/σ1)) = σ1f1F (t/σ1) = MG1∧G2(d˜1 | t2 = −t).
Moreover, t1 = 0 implies that MG1∧G2(d˜2 | t2 = t) = σ2f(−t/σ2)F (0) = MG1∨G2(d˜2 | t2 = t).
This completes the proof. ♦
Remark 4. Due to Corollary 2, µ = 0 implies that M(d˜2 | t2 = t) = M(d˜2 | t2 = −t) for either
voting rule under study. Consequently, if µ = 0 and t1 = 0, then every relationship under (G1∨G2)-
rule can be derived from the corresponding relationship obtained for the (G1 ∧G2)-rule by means
of the y-axis reflection. Thus, in this case, the situations where voting is organized according to
the (G1 ∧G2)-rule and according to the (G1 ∨G2)-rule are, in a certain sense, dual. ♦
Note that under the (G1 ∨ G2)-rule, Group 1 benefits from excessive claims of Group 2 (i.e.,
from high threshold t2). In this case, if threshold t1 is positive, but not so high, then most decisions
are made for the benefit of Group 1. On the other hand, at a low threshold t2, Group 2 ensures
implementation of almost all proposals, and so most proposals unfavorable to Group 1 pass through
the “riddle” of voting.
Now let us consider the maximization problem for the Group 2 advantage M(d˜2 − d˜1) over
Group 1 provided that the (G1 ∨G2)-rule is adopted.
Proposition 3. Under the (G1∨G2)-rule, the expected advantage M(d˜2−d˜1) of a Group 2 member
over a Group 1 member attains its maximum value at the claim threshold t2 defined by
t+2 = µ−
σ1f1
F1
. (16)
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Proof. Differentiating (9) with respect to t2 yields:
dM(d˜1 − d˜2)
d t2
=
d (σ1 f1F2 − σ2f2F1)
d t2
= σ1f1f2 ·
(
σ−12
)− σ2f2−(t2 − µ)
σ22
F1.
Setting this derivative equal to zero one arrives at (16). The second derivative test confirms
that this unique extremum is a minimum. Thus, (16) provides a maximum value to the function
M(d˜2 − d˜1). ♦
The maximum comparative gain M(d˜2− d˜1) of Group 2 attained at the claim threshold t+2 tends
to zero as t1 → −∞ (in the limit, all proposals are accepted by the votes of Group 1) and tends to
its maximum value when t1 →∞ (in the limit, Group 1 does not support any proposals).
As well as in the case of the (G1 ∧ G2)-rule, consider the problem of maximizing, by choosing
t2, the capital of the whole society. The solution is provided by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the (G1 ∨G2)-rule is adopted. Then the expected capital increment
of the whole society attains its maximum value at the Group 2 claim threshold given by
t02 = −
g1
g2
(
µ− σ1f1
F1
)
. (17)
Proof. By Theorem 1 (see Eq. (1)) the expected capital increment of the whole society is
g1M(d˜1) + g2M(d˜2) = g1 ·
(
µF2 + (µF1 + σ1f1)F2
)
+ g2 ·
(
µF1 + (µF2 + σ2f2)F1
)
= (g1 + g2)µF1 + g1σ1f1 + g2σ2F1f2 +
(
g1 ·(µ − µF1 − σ1f1) + g2µF1
)
F2.
The derivative of this function w. r. t. t2 is:
d (g1M(d˜1) + g2M(d˜2))
d t2
= g2σ2F1f2
−(t2 − µ)
σ22
+
(
g1 ·(µ − µF1 − σ1f1) + g2µF1
)
f2 ·
(−σ−12 ).
Setting it equal to 0 we have: −g2F1 (t02 − µ) = g1 ·(µF1 − σ1f1) + g2µF1, which leads to (17).
Finally, using the second derivative test we verify that the point in question provides the maximum
value. ♦
Remark 5. Comparing Propositions 3 and 4 we obtain the following (cf. Remark 3). At g1 = g2,
the value t+2 of the claim threshold t2 of Group 2 that leads to the maximum advantage over Group 1
and the value t02 that maximizes the capital of the whole society are opposite. In particular, this
is the case for the example in Fig. 3. Moreover, even if g1 6= g2, the thresholds t+2 and t02 have
different signs (or both are equal to zero), since, as well as in the case of the (G1 ∧ G2)-rule,
t02 = −(g1/g2)t+2 . ♦
Now consider the issue of maximizing the capital increment of the whole society when the
(G1 ∨ G2)-rule is employed. In a certain sense, the result is dual to the one derived for the
(G1 ∧ G2)-rule. Namely, Proposition 4 implies that the claim thresholds of the groups, t1 and t2,
that maximize the capital increment of the whole society satisfy the following system of equations:
t1 = −g2
g1
(
µ− σ2f2
F2
)
; t2 = −g1
g2
(
µ− σ1f1
F1
)
,
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where σ1, σ2, f1, f2, F1, and F2 are defined in Theorem 1. In the simplest case g1 = g2, the above
system of equations reduces to
t1 = −µ+ σ1f1
F1
; t2 = t1.
The dependence on µ of the claim threshold t of both groups that maximizes the capital of
the society is illustrated (for the case of g1 = g2 = 300 and σ = 10) in Fig. 4. In particular, for
g1 = g2 = g˜ and µ = 0, the corresponding threshold is t = σy0
/√
g˜, where y0 ≈ 0.506 is the solution
of the equation y = f(y)/F (y), f(y) and F (y) being the density and distribution function of the
standard normal distribution, respectively.
Fig. 4. Relationship between the parameter µ and the claim threshold t = t1 = t2 of both groups that
maximizes the capital increment of the whole society in the case of g1 = g2 = 300 and σ = 10.
In contrast to voting based on the (G1 ∧ G2)-rule, the claim threshold of both groups that
maximizes the capital of the society under the (G1 ∨ G2)-rule is positive (if the voting rule is not
conservative, then the voters have to be conservative); for g1 = g2 it tends to zero from above as
µ→∞ and asymptotically approaches to the line t = −µ as µ→ −∞ (see Fig. 4).
4. CONCLUSION
This paper has studied the social dynamics determined by voting of two cohesive groups in a
stochastic environment. Two groups of similar size (a kind of a “two-party system”) have been
considered; this makes reasonable the application of the voting procedure which requires the support
of both groups for the acceptance of any proposal (the unanimous acceptance group rule).
Another procedure in which the support of either group suffices for the acceptance of a proposal
(the unanimous rejection group rule) looks a little less natural. However, using this procedure does
not lead to an infinite sequence of contradictory decisions suggested by different groups since the
proposals in the model are generated by the stochastic environment.
Each group supports only those proposals that increase the average capital of its members by an
amount exceeding the claim threshold set by the group. The relationship between social dynamics
and the claim thresholds of the groups was the main subject of the present study.
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In particular, we have derived analytical expressions for the capital increments of the groups in
terms of their claim thresholds. It has been shown that under the unanimous acceptance group
rule and the equal size of the groups, the claim threshold of a group that ensures the maximum
advantage over the other group and the claim threshold that maximizes the capital of the whole
society are opposite. Moreover, the first above threshold is equal to the average capital increment of
the competing group members over the proposals supported by the competing group. Furthermore,
it turns out that the claim thresholds of the groups that maximize the capital of the whole society
are negative, which can be interpreted as the profitability of a certain appetite for risk in the case
of a conservative voting rule; the dependence of these thresholds on the environment favorability
has been established. Similar (in fact, dual) results have been obtained for the unanimous rejection
group rule.
It should be emphasized that the phenomena observed are not only inherent in the model
under consideration; the most important ones have real prototypes widely discussed in the relevant
literature.
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